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Abstract 
Through an ethnographic account of the decision-making process of the World 
Social Forum (WSF) and its governance structures, specifically the 
International Council and the Local Organising Committee, the micro-politics 
of the alter-globalisation movements will be explored. Looking at the debates 
around whether the WSF should be an open arena or become an actor, the 
paradox of the “tyranny of structurelessness” will be presented. More 
accurately, this paper exposes the asymmetry between the values and the 
practices of the WSF process by analysing the role of “social movement 
entrepreneurs” and the complex constellations of conflicting interests. 
Theoretical claims of horizontal consensual and open decision-making are 
used to eliminate any democratic procedure, paving the way to highly unequal 
oppressive power relations that dominate the deliberative space of encounter 
between different movements. The paper questions the capacity of the World 
Social Forum to articulate alternatives to neoliberalism, and to present 
different and more democratic ways of doing politics.   
After having unmasked the oppressive power structures within a social 
movement claiming to fight against them, this paper advocates for moving 
beyond the WSF discursive dichotomy of “neoliberal/anti-neoliberal”, and calls 
for a Gramscian resistance to the hegemonic neoliberal discourse played 
through direct transformative engagement with the institutions of our society. 
This paper offers a detailed view inside the black box of decision-making 
processes within social movements contributing to the academic as well as the 
activists’ debate on their governance. This analysis is particularly relevant in 
the light of the global occupy and anti-austerity movements, which have been 
making similar claims to those of the WSF of being a leaderless initiative, 
without any political affiliation, and using consensual methodologies, thus 
facing some of the same shortcomings and challenges.  
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There is another world, but it is in this one 
  Paul Éluard 
 
Introduction 
After the struggle of Seattle (1999), the movements opposing neoliberal policies 
gathered to discuss alternatives at the World Social Forum (WSF). According to 
its Charter, the WSF is “an open meeting space for reflective thinking, 
democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of 
experiences and interlinking for effective action” for all those who are opposed 
“to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of 
imperialism” (WSF, 2001).  
Despite the WSF’s attempt to formulate this opposition in positive terms by 
borrowing the Zapatista's formula of “One big no and many yesses” 
(Kingsnorth, 2003 cited in Glasius & Timms, 2005, p. 223) – where the no 
refers to neoliberalism – what unifies the actors is their fight against the 
common neoliberal ‘enemy’. In other words, the WSF is largely defined by what 
it stands against rather than by what it stands for. Diversity is claimed to be 
“one of the distinguishing features of the WSF” (Glasius & Timms, 2005, p. 
193), but in order to enrol a wide range of actors in an open space, the forum 
avoided clear political statements and the support of any specific issue. 
The WSF also adopted the Zapatista claim of changing the world without 
taking power. Rather than leading to a deeper reflection about the management 
of power, this has left the issue of power implicit and unclearly defined, 
particularly regarding internal organization, the consequences of which will be 
analysed in this paper. Naomi Klein argues that the new WSF framework 
“encourages, celebrates and fiercely protects the right to diversity: cultural 
diversity, ecological diversity, agricultural diversity–and yes, political diversity 
as well: different ways of doing politics” (2001). But how is it possible to do 
politics differently, ignoring power and having as the only common 
denominator the opposition to neoliberalism? Since the very beginning of the 
WSF process, this question raised a substantive debate between those who 
wanted the WSF to remain an open arena and those who wanted it to become a 
political actor.1 Both models require some sort of governance, even though it is 
more complex with the latter. The governance of a process that claims to include 
everyone opposing neoliberalism and imperialism, and to refuse traditional 
democratic methodologies inspired by liberal-democratic processes, is highly 
problematic. The debate around internal social movements structures is linked 
to the tension between “fluidity and structure”, that is to say between a 
                                                        
1 The question “arena or actor?” has been one of the crucial debates in the WSF literature and in 
the WSF process (e.g. Whitaker, 2004). The debate has seen some people arguing for the “open 
space” (Sen 2004), while others supporting the concept of “movement of movements” 
(Teivainen, 2004), later reconceptualised in “network of networks” (Houtart 2007) or “World 
Social Movement Network” (Escobar, 2004), with the idea of the WSF as a political actor. In this 
paper “open meeting space”, “open space”, or “open arena” are used interchangeably. 
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supposedly “more informal and horizontal logic” and a focus on “efficiency and 
delegation” (Pleyers, 2010, p. 212). 
Della Porta (2009) has problematised the issue of internal democracy within the 
WSF, emphasising the auto-critical and self-reflexive character of the actors 
involved. Teivainen (2007, 2012) emphasised how lack of structures generate 
some ambiguity and can have a depoliticising effect, leading to undemocratic 
governance and leadership. This paper contributes to this body of works 
reflecting on the WSF internal governance practices by exploring what Caruso 
(2013) calls the tension between “aspirations and practices (vision and 
methods)” (81). The article analyses the internal decision-making process and 
other practices of the WSF to expose some of its contradictions, and try to 
understand whether or not the WSF has been able to articulate in practice the 
alternatives that it seeks to express, and also whether or not it is presenting 
different more democratic ways of doing politics. The article analyses the WSF 
process at a significant point in its development; despite its choice to remain an 
open space, the WSF 2007 tried to develop concrete proposals through a 
methodology that saw one full day dedicated to thematic meetings to draw up 
action plans. 
This argument is based on the critical work of some scholars and activists, and 
on my reflexive autoethnography in the attempt to deconstruct the mainstream 
discourses around the WSF. This paper offers a critical insider perspective on 
the process, and is the outcome of years of involvement at different levels in the 
World Social Forum process with a growing reflexive approach.2  
 
The WSF 2007 
The most widely known aspect of the WSF are the global events that have taken 
place since 2001, always involving between 20,000 and 155,000 participants 
from more than 100 countries. The initial three forums were held in Porto 
Alegre, then the forum moved to India in 2004, came back to Brazil in 2005 
and, after a year of three continental events, the 2007 edition took place in 
Nairobi (Kenya). The following year, the forum was substituted by a 
decentralised day of global action. In 2009, the forum was held again in Brazil. 
Subsequently, it was held in Senegal (2011), Brazil (2012), and Tunisia (2013 
and 2015). Apart from the global events, there are local, national, regional and 
thematic forums. While global events are organised by a local organising 
committee, an International Council (IC) has steered the direction of the 
process and took decisions on forums’ locations. The 2007 WSF event in 
Nairobi was the first one to take place on the African continent and it has been 
described by some as the most progressive gathering that has ever taken place 
                                                        
2 More specifically, I have participated in various European Social Forums (2002, 2003, 2004, 
2008), the WSF International Council meetings (March 2006, October 2006, January 2007), 
the work of the Local Organising Committee of the WSF 2007 in Nairobi and in many networks 
connected to the WSF process. I was also sent to represent a workers organisation at the WSF 
2009 in the Amazon. 
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in the African continent. According to the organising committee 57,000 people 
registered, 60% from Africa and of these 70% from Kenya. It has also been 
considered to be the baptism of an emerging Pan-African civil society and 
offered a space to new movements, previously largely invisible. For instance, a 
very important achievement was the presence of an LGBTQ space within the 
forum, giving visibility to a strongly repressed movement in the continent 
(Conway, 2013).  
However, many activists and scholars have made strong criticisms. A major 
difference from other forums was due to the diverse nature of African civil 
society. Churches and development NGOs were the most prominent presence at 
the forum, reflecting a reality in which the Church is often the (only) major 
mass movement at the grassroots level and the remaining work with the most 
marginalised people is often conducted by mostly foreign-funded professional 
NGOs working in development. Other criticisms I further explore below regard 
the sponsorships, the choice of catering services, the ‘militarisation’ of the 
forum space and the social exclusion due to entry fees. These issues are by no 
means unique to the 2007 edition but were particularly evident in Nairobi, 
pushing key activist Walden Bello to argue that the WSF had achieved its 
historical function and should be dissolved.3 
While this article critically explores the practices around the 2007 WSF, it is 
important to acknowledge that the WSF and its governing body, the IC, 
acknowledged the need for change and engaged in an open debate and 
experimented with different commissions’ models with mixed results (whose 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper). There has also been a working 
group on the future of the IC, established in 2012, and in 2013 a discussion 
around the radical proposal to dissolve the IC in order to create a more active 
political movement.  
 
Governance, leadership and internal democracy 
The organisational structure of social movements has been part of the reflection 
of activists and scholars for a long time. Such discussion is inevitably 
intertwined with the issue of leadership and the role it plays in processes of 
social change. Despite a growing interest, social movements’ leadership is still 
considered a ‘black box’ and more scholarship is needed to understand 
movements’ internal governance. Morriss and Staggenbord (2007) call for more 
grounded investigations of how leadership affects the emergence, internal 
dynamics and successes of social movements. A number of contributions (e.g. 
Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001; Gitlin, 2003) have stimulated further 
explorations and looked at the importance of individual leaders, their 
personality and trajectories. These contributions also examine whether the 
process of selecting leadership and the internal decision-making are consistent 
                                                        
3 Bello, W. The World Social Forum at the Crossroad, 5/5/2007, available online: 
http://www.commondreams.org/views/2007/05/05/world-social-forum-crossroads 
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with the democratic values that are at the core of some movements’ identity. 
This conversation links very well with another important and related set of 
debates about democracy in social movements. 
On the one hand, the global process of the WSF has facilitated the exploration of 
internal governance and leadership of movements by enabling comparison 
between the movements which meet at WSF events. On the other hand, it has 
extended the reflection about what the governance of a global meeting space for 
a variety of movements may look like, particularly considering its reluctance to 
call itself a movement. It is this latter reflection that is of relevance for this 
paper. Movements’ leadership and governance are already complex in 
themselves, but they become increasingly so at a global scale where the tension 
between consensual deliberation and representational decision-making play out 
more strongly (Teivainen & Caruso, 2014). On this regard, Della Porta (2013) 
provides a comprehensive overview of different conceptualisations of 
democracy and their relevance for internal movement organisation. In 
particular, she stresses the difference between a liberal democratic model and a 
participatory deliberative one. In the first, what matters is the democratic 
selection of the leadership, which represents pre-existing identities of members. 
In the second model, through a consensual and participatory process, members 
directly contribute to decision-making while at the same time forming their own 
identities and opinions. 
The discussion over different conceptualisations of movements’ democracy is 
strongly related with another older and important debate within social 
movement studies about the tension between ‘spontaneity’ and 
‘bureaucratisation’. This tension is somehow exacerbated in the complexity of 
the WSF, making it a privileged viewpoint. I am particularly interested in how 
‘ideologies of spontaneity’ (Barker et al., 2001) affect the practice of a global 
process of coordination between hundreds of organisations.  
Various authors, looking at many different contexts, have argued that social 
movements are not necessarily democratic. Nanda and Sinha (1999; 2003) 
describe populist undemocratic agrarian Indian movements, while Harvey – 
referring to democratic struggles in Mexico – writes that “internal practices may 
reproduce hierarchical rules and discrimination, [...] popular movements are 
not inherently democratic” (Harvey, 1998, p. 29). The WSF also struggles to be 
in practice the open democratic process that it aspires to be. This problematic 
aspect has also been extensively highlighted by Pleyers (2010) who argues that 
there is a structural problem in the movements and organisations converging in 
the WSF in that committed leaders ignore issues of internal democracy, 
claiming that it is a secondary issue compared to current struggles and 
campaigns. This apparent incoherence between values and practices has often 
been justified by some leaders of social movements in terms of a need for 
“efficiency” (Pleyers, 2010). From a feminist perspective, Conway presents a 
strong critique of the WSF governance arguing that “systemic sexism extend[s] 
from the events themselves, to the organising processes, to the governance 
bodies of the forum” (2011, p. 56). She also points out that the substantial 
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presence of feminist grassroots events is “systematically ignored intellectually 
and politically in the non-feminist spaces of the forum” (p. 56). 
 
The practices of the WSF 2007 
This section analyses the contradictions between the WSF discourse of open 
space and democratic debate, and its hegemonic practices. These contradictions 
have been underlined already by Albert, Sen and Teivainen (2004; 2004; 2004) 
in relation to Brazilian WSFs, Caruso (2004) in relation to the Indian WSF; and 
Conway (2011, 2013) about the entire process. I only focus on the WSF 2007 in 
Nairobi. It is important to notice that such critical engagement has been a 
constant feature of the WSF as a process of reflexive learning in which scholar-
activists have used critique as a way to advance the debate on the nature and 
direction of the WSF.  
The heterogeneity and diversity of its participants transform the WSF into an 
arena of conflicting interests with poor structures to deal with them (Caruso, 
2004). The initiators established the International Council that would steer the 
process and nominate a Local Organizing Committee to organise specific WSF 
events. Six years after the beginning of the process, the International Council 
was a group of self-appointed friends who were deciding who could or could not 
join the Council; there was no change in the core organisations leading the 
process. Moreover, apart from key Brazilian actors, the committee was 
disproportionally composed of European actors. In order to participate, 
organisations were supposed to be able to pay for travel and related expenses 
for their representative to attend meetings in different parts of the world at least 
four times a year. Consensus methodologies were strongly shaped by pre-
formed alliances and the charisma of certain established members. Moreover, 
the organisation of the forum events should normally be carried out by a 
coalition of local actors, but in the case of the WSF 2007 this was contracted to 
one NGO. 
 
Hegemonic and excluding practices in the preparation of  
the WSF 2007 
 
The first and essentially the only meeting of the Social Mobilisation Committee 
has been held in the headquarters of SODNET, the NGO that won the tender for 
the WSF and hosted the secretariat. The office is in Lavington, one of the most 
exclusive areas of Nairobi in front of one UN agency. To enter, there is a 
checkpoint with guards, and another kilometre ahead, you find another check 
point where you are asked your name. The guards then call the main office, and 
if they get a positive answer you are allowed to enter. It is the most inaccessible 
place I have ever been since I moved to Nairobi. 
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This extract from my own anthropological diary of the WSF shows how – eight 
months before the event – the possibility of a WSF as an open space was already 
compromised. The headquarters of the organising committee were absolutely 
inaccessible, and adequate only for formal meetings with a limited number of 
participants, who had to come by car or else by walking long distances. The 
Social Mobilisation Committee – in theory the most important committee in 
making a forum in a new country a success – had met once, and had two failed 
meetings with less than 5 people attending. This emerging contradiction is well 
expressed in the report of the Kenya Social Forum coordinator, who describes 
one of the key organisers, a world-famous activist, as being “as intolerant inside 
the board room as she was ‘revolutionary’ and ‘inclusive’ on public rostrums” 
(Oloo, 2007). The Kenya Social Forum coordinator was chosen to provide 
legitimacy to the process; during its preparation he felt excluded, and strongly 
denounced the practices of the Organising Committee. In his reflections after 
the forum, he describes his experience in these terms. 
 
I have never encountered a bunch of such intolerant, arrogant and vindictive 
colleagues as the ones I had to endure during the planning and execution of 
WSF Nairobi 2007. First of all, the working environment at the Nairobi-based 
WSF 2007 Secretariat is the very antithesis of the WSF concept of an open 
space. Authoritarian decisions are made, often without consultation, by people 
who insist on imperiously chairing every single meeting – a far cry from the 
rotating chairs I was accustomed to. They draw up the agenda, decide on who 
can speak and for how long and will not hesitate to cut off, shout down and 
lecture anyone who appears to be challenging them (Oloo, 2007).  
 
In October 2006, during the WSF International Council in Parma, while 
speakers as confident as they were ignorant about what was going on in Nairobi 
were talking about the inclusive and effective preparation of the forthcoming 
forum, I asked to speak to some IC members to express my critical points. (I 
was there as an observer who requires authorisation to speak). I was told that 
they knew my criticisms were well founded, but they could not raise those 
points because it would have meant criticising the Local Organising Committee, 
and be accused of colonialism (i.e. where the whites challenge the blacks). It was 
no surprise when just a few months later, I read the following in the above-
mentioned report of the Kenya Social Forum coordinator: “Another dastardly 
thing was the abuse of the race card when it came to dealing with criticism from 
North American, European and even Indian comrades. [...] Some of my 
colleagues would resort to the most cynical emotional blackmail by dismissing 
their white-skin critics in race-loaded terms calculated to silence and stifle 
debate” (Oloo, 2007). This attitude prevented any request for accountability in 
what was supposed to be an open process. 
The type of decision-making process established in the WSF was particularly 
vulnerable to the domination of “social movement entrepreneurs”: charismatic 
figures who can confidently address different audiences, and who are often 
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more well-known on global stages than in the country where they claim to do 
grassroots work. They often represent only themselves, but through the 
legitimacy they gain from international fame can speak on behalf of others. For 
instance, in my work I invited a prominent activist to tour Europe in a series of 
high-profile meetings where she enchanted all her audiences, claiming to speak 
for poor African women. She got useful contacts for future funding, and even 
higher profile invitations to address global UN meetings. “Social movement 
entrepreneurs” are professional activists working for their own organisation 
(often more than one). One of these organisations – presenting a façade of a 
coalition – won the tender for the WSF, emphasising the need for a forum in 
East Africa. With no logistical capacity and with a coalition that was made of “a 
handful of people who decided to privatise a very public and of course very 
global process” (Oloo, 2007), they embarked in the preparation of the WSF 
2007 – an activist, her best friend, and her son were managing the entire 
process. 
 
The hegemonic use of consensual methodology and  
the failure of technology 
The WSF event was divided into different thematic areas; one of the objectives 
was to create new connections and collaborations among different organisations 
and movements working on the same struggles, and possibly come up with 
common strategies. The forum was structured with opening and closing events 
and four working days in the middle; three days were dedicated to the various 
activities proposed by different actors, while the last day was supposed to be 
used to get the actors working on the same thematic area to elaborate proposals, 
and draw up a global action plan.  
The three days of activities were supposed to interlink organisations working on 
the same topic through an online platform. Organisations could express their 
interest and propose activities; others would see an interesting proposal, get in 
touch, and prepare common activities. The idea was that the neutrality and 
horizontality of a software program would be able to put together actors who 
did not know each other. Rather than solving the issue of power and hierarchy, 
not having a trusted facilitator resulted in many activities turning into poorly 
attended presentations of one organisation’s activities. In those activities where 
different organisations worked together, the organisations usually knew each 
other before the forum and were often meetings between local NGOs and their 
European/Northern funders. Organisations generally refused to cancel their 
own activities and merge them with others proposed by unknown actors from 
another corner of the globe. 
The fourth day of thematic meetings set to build global action plans – which was 
supposed to be the major methodological innovation of the WSF 2007 to make 
the WSF more action-oriented – did not work out as expected. A telling example 
was the thematic meeting of the movements working on the issue of foreign 
debt in developing countries. The idea was that all global organisations working 
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on debt would meet and discuss proposals. The organisation Jubilee USA 
imposed itself as the facilitator of the discussion process through consensus 
methodology; they immediately presented their previously prepared draft 
declaration and asked for input in amending it. There were two major problems 
with this; first, the person making the main proposal was also the person 
facilitating the discussion. The overlapping of these two roles is what turns a 
potentially participatory methodology into one actor dominating the entire 
discussion. Normally, if the facilitator wants to intervene, they should give the 
role of facilitator to someone else, but this did not happen.4 The second issue 
was that Jubilee USA came with its own draft ready. Consensus methodology 
cannot be used to simply ratify the proposal of one particular organisation, 
especially when this declaration is meant to represent all global movements 
working on debt.  
The result was an inadequate declaration very similar to previous ones, entirely 
focused on the perspective of ‘Northern’ activists. The document did not 
mention the co-responsibility of the governments of the ‘South’, which was a 
central issue for those who work on debt relief/cancellation/repudiation in the 
‘South’. The proposed actions were the same that characterised the debt 
movement in previous years, most of which were not particularly meaningful in 
Africa, such as fasting against debt and collecting signatures. In their dual role 
of facilitators and main proponents, they succeeded in dominating the process 
and making people agree on their draft without any constructive debate. No 
relevant amendments were made apart from two minor cosmetic changes on 
adjectives. But that problematic declaration was launched with many 
organisations signing it as the global declaration on debt.  
This attitude reflects the partnership model on which some ‘Northern’ 
organisations base their relationship with their ‘Southern’ counterparts; without 
engaging in any deep reciprocal knowledge, they fund local organisations which 
are often empty boxes, that maintain big offices and are very professional in 
managing PR with funders during events such as the WSF. Organisations that 
often thrive on debt, and have little interest in its cancellation.  
 
Access to the Forum 
A serious issue of access was totally ignored by the organisers: the entry fee to 
the Forum set for Africans was US$7, in a country where 56% of the population 
was living on less than a dollar a day. This meant that people could come only if 
an NGO would sponsor them; they therefore needed to be part of a network 
with sufficient financial resources. For local people, attendance was already very 
costly in terms of loss of income for the time away from work, and also implied 
transportation costs. 
                                                        
4 Consensus methodologies put a strong emphasis on the role of facilitation. One key rule is that 
the facilitator plays a sort of neutral role. If the facilitator wants to make a point in the 
discussion, he/she should give his/her role to someone else.  
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The only positive note presented in the previously-mentioned report by the 
Kenyan Social Forum coordinator was “the presence of 4,000 slum dwellers 
facilitated by an inter-faith network” (Oloo, 2007). However, he did not 
mention how that actually came about in practice. After strenuous negotiation, a 
network of slum dwellers agreed to accept 500 entry passes at a subsidised rate. 
When they went to collect them, the Organising Committee had no personnel 
and told the network members to go in their storage area and stamp the passes 
by themselves. Instead of stamping and taking 500 passes, the network took 
5,000 passes which were distributed through partner organisations and local 
churches to the Nairobi slum dwellers. Without this “theft”, the private guards 
patrolling the WSF fortress would have prevented people from entering. This 
action saved the image of the Forum, which remained poorly attended but at 
least had visible local participation.5 
When the contradiction of the high entry fee was exposed, under strong 
pressure the Organising Committee decided to keep a policy of  openaccess to 
the Forum, but it was not clearly communicated to the private guards, who 
continued to enforce pass control. However, this decision was a last-minute 
initiative; there had been proposals to establish a solidarity fund to facilitate the 
access of local people; and the International Council approved the idea but it 
never became a reality because no one put money into it, and the local 
committee did not implement it. 
It was not only a problem of individual access; many organisations were equally 
excluded since a venue for a two-hour event could cost up to 500 euros. This 
was an affordable rate for internationally-funded development NGOs, but not 
for local social movements. It is not surprising that some local organisations, 
unhappy with the process of the WSF, organised an Alternative Social Forum, 
which was free and in the city centre (the WSF was located about 10 kilometres 
away).  
The IC enthusiastically replied positively to the proposal of holding the forum in 
Africa, but there was a lack of consistent economic support. In theory, the Local 
Organising Committee should fundraise for the event. But if for the Latin 
American Forums (Brazil and Venezuela) both central and local government 
provided a substantial financial contribution, the same could not be expected 
from a government with little interest in social movements and anti-neoliberal 
struggles. Therefore, the Local Organising Committee attempted to raise funds 
through fees, licences for commercial stalls, and advertisement, compromising 
the nature of the open space. 
                                                        
5 There is an unrealistic claim that over 40,000 participants from Africa attended the Forum. 
However, this is a ridiculous estimation based on the fact that the open policy they applied 
forced them to count people and make estimations, rather than looking at actual registration. 
The figure was achieved by counting the same people several times, and adding an estimation of 
the people attending related events inside the UN compounds and so forth. The reality is that 
without those 5,000 passes distributed in the slums through church-related networks – which 
also helped people with their transportation costs – local participation would have been barely 
visible. 
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The privatisation of the Forum space 
As Glasius and Timms remarked, “Every Forum consumes goods and services – 
otherwise it could not take place” (2005, p. 232). However, there are different 
ways to deal with provision aspects. While it is normal that local governments 
fund the WSF events and lobby to host them expecting economic returns – and 
that prices are inflated “to exploit participants” (Glasius & Timms, 2005, p. 232) 
– the WSF should preserve its anti-neoliberal soul at least within the WSF 
space. In 2006, Glasius and Timms warned against the risk that the Forum 
could become “a sales floor with a discussion area” (p. 233); that is what 
happened with the Nairobi Forum: it became a forum of tenders and 
subcontracting, i.e. an NGO fair.6 
While WSF scholars (e.g. Santos, 2007) emphasise the important creation of the 
Africa Water Network during the WSF 2007, bottles of privatised water were 
sold at the price of a half day’s local salary. Food provision was subcontracted to 
private companies, among them a company owned by the family of a member of 
the Kenya Social Forum, and the 5-star catering service of the hotel owned by 
the then Kenyan Minister of Internal Security – one of the richest men in the 
country, as well as the person accused of tortures and extra-judicial murders 
committed by the police during the previous regime. Prices were high even by 
European standards (Oloo, 2007). 
Funds for the WSF events are received without thought to the contradictions 
connected with the first article in the WSF charter, i.e. opposition to 
neoliberalism. Funds derive from the core of the neoliberal supporters: the Ford 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and in the case of the WSF 2003, 
even the oil company BR Petrobras.7 Governments also fund the WSF, 
threatening the non-governmental and non-party nature of the Forum. Among 
the sponsors, there were also several international NGOs that receive funds 
from USAID, and therefore the US government indirectly funds the Forum. The 
fact that such pro-neoliberal actors are willing to fund the Forum is very telling. 
If opposition to neoliberal globalisation remains confined to a yearly folkloristic 
festival led by neoliberal NGOs, why not fund such an innocuous gathering and 
by so doing legitimise the neoliberal democratic discourse? In this regard, 
Michel Chossudovsky (2010) tries to understand why organisations such as the 
Ford Foundation fund actors involved in anti-capitalist struggles. He argues 
that neoliberal organisations are “funding dissent” in order to oversee and 
shape their various activities; and he concludes that alongside the process 
described by Chomsky in his book Manufacturing Consent, there is a parallel 
and equally important process of “manufacturing dissent” in a way that does not 
threaten the establishment. 
                                                        
6 See for instance the article, ‘World Social Forum: just another NGO fair?’ by Firoze Manji 
(2007), Pambazuka News, Issue 288. Available online: 
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/39464 
7 For a list of the funders, see “Financial sponsors of the WSF” in Timms and Glasius (2005, p. 
230). 
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The Nairobi Forum constituted an embarrassing precedent for the extent to 
which private sponsors were used. A telling example was the contract with 
Celtel, a large multinational telecommunications company that associated its 
logo with the WSF; not having money for advertisement banners in the city, the 
Local Organising Committee in Nairobi signed a contract with one of the main 
mobile service providers that became the official WSF sponsor, and offered 
around 150,000 euros of communication services. Around the city, the WSF was 
advertised with the logo of this big multinational telecommunication company. 
The employees of the multinational also managed the registration desks where 
people could register to the Forum using mobile credit bought on the spot, and 
getting their SIM cards activated.  
 
Analysis  
In this section, I would like to make sense of some of the questions raised by the 
challenges described above. Let me start by looking at an ontological and 
methodological problem. Some years after the WSF’s inception, criticisms of the 
open arena became very strong because the WSF could not set a clear agenda 
with defined objectives, and therefore it was considered ineffective in resisting 
the neoliberal project. According to Whitaker, some people saw the WSF “as an 
obstacle to gaining efficacy in the struggle to overcome neoliberalism” (2008), 
but he claims that this criticism came from the people who think about the WSF 
rather than from the people who do the WSF. As an activist who does and thinks 
about the WSF, I argue that the ontological debate on the nature of the WSF – 
whether the WSF should be just an open space (the arena model) for discussion, 
or should become a political actor – has never been solved. In 2007, the will to 
preserve the openness of the WSF space was coupled with the need for an action 
plan. The choice has been to keep the WSF as an open space, but at the same 
time to prepare shared global action plans; however, no appropriate governance 
structure was created. This created a relevant methodological issue.  
The unwillingness to acknowledge the need for a different organisational 
structure with an explicit and transparent decision-making process generated 
implicit and hidden struggles that served the interests of some better-organised 
groups. As Whitaker recognised, “self-nominated social movements [...] seek to 
put the forum inside their own mobilising dynamics, to serve their own 
objectives” (Whitaker, 2004). According to Teivainen, until the WSF establishes 
“internal procedures for democratic collective will-formation” (2004, p. 126), it 
is not possible to express its interests as a collective movement. However, the 
supporters of the ‘arena’ claim that the forum has to remain an open space, 
refusing institutionalisation and bureaucratisation. Without structures and 
procedures in place, power relations among the organising actors played out in 
a way that their influence reflected their capacity to raise economic resources, 
rather than their representativeness in terms of the size of their grassroots 
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support.8 The choice of a ‘light structure’ to facilitate the process has led to a 
lack of defined procedures to deal explicitly with internal conflicts; the open 
space has become a chaotic arena, and powerful interests exploit the situation to 
promote their own interests.9  
A useful theoretical framework for making sense of this process comes from the 
concept of the “tyranny of structurelessness” (Freeman, 1972). Jo Freeman, a 
feminist scholar who has been writing about social movements since the 1960s, 
examined feminist movements in the 1970s and the effects of their claim of 
being leaderless and structureless. Although she looks at the organisation of 
smaller movements, her analysis is relevant for making sense of some of the 
processes that have been happening in the WSF. 
She claims that while the idea of structureless movements in reaction to the 
hyper-structured and hierarchical existing social organisation was a powerful 
political stance, in the feminist movement, the adoption of the idea of 
structurelessness became “a goddess in its own right”. She argues that there is 
no such a thing as a structureless group: “Any group of people of whatever 
nature that comes together for any length of time for any purpose will inevitably 
structure itself in some fashion” (p. 152). She argues that the problem of 
structurelessness did not emerge immediately when the movement wanted to 
raise consciousness, but rather when the movements finally decided to do 
something specific. Similarly, at its inception the WSF wanted to gather people 
opposing neoliberalism, and start a process from there. The problem became 
stronger when the WSF wanted to draw action plans. According to Freeman, the 
problem is that the lack of an explicit and agreed procedure helps some people 
– generally the strong – to “establish unquestioned hegemony over others”. 
According to Freeman, such hegemony imposes itself easily, because “the idea 
of ‘structurelessness’ does not prevent the formation of informal structures”. 
Structurelessness becomes “a way of masking power […] most strongly 
advocated by those who are the most powerful” (p. 154). Consequently, she 
explains the importance of having a formal structure and procedures in place. 
 
The rules of decision-making must be open and available to everyone, and this 
can happen only if they are formalised. This is not to say that formalisation of a 
structure of a group will destroy the informal structure. It usually doesn’t. But it 
does hinder the informal structure from having predominant control and make 
available some means of attacking it if the people involved are not at least 
responsible to the needs of the group at large. “Structurelessness” is 
organisationally impossible. We cannot decide whether to have a structured or 
                                                        
8 Teivainen argues that NGOs based in capital cities may have better economic resources, and 
ultimately play a more influential role in the WSF process than vast popular movements with 
much wider support at a grassroots level (2004).   
9 An interesting example can be found in the work of Caruso (2004) on conflict management 
and hegemonic practices in the World Social Forum 2004, where he suggests that “clearer 
norms need to be discussed and agreed” as well as “procedures to ensure inclusion”. 
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structureless group, only whether or not to have a formally structured one 
(Freeman, 1972, p. 155). 
 
She argues that maintaining the informal structure, especially in unstructured 
groups, forms the base of elite power. She describes how friendship groups work 
as “networks of communications outside any regular channels”, and if there are 
no formal channels, such friendship networks function as the only 
communication tool. This is very similar to what has happened with the original 
leadership of the International Council. Freeman warns, “When informal elites 
are combined with a myth of ‘structurelessness,’ there can be no attempt to put 
limits on the use of power” (p. 158). As I will show, the myth of the ‘open space’ 
worked similarly to the 1970s feminist claim of structurelessness, and coupled 
to the dominant informal elite of the International Council at global level and 
the NGO organising the forum in Nairobi, this led to virtually unchallengeable 
and strong power relations. As Caruso explains in relation to the Indian WSF 
2004, “The concept of the ‘open space’ was used differently by different actors: 
to silence criticism, to impose authority [...], to explain inevitable failures [...] to 
placate controversy and to win arguments” (Caruso, 2005, p. 203).  
Moreover, Freeman reminds how contrarily to formal structures, informal 
structures have no obligation to be responsible or accountable to the group at 
large. She concludes, arguing that, “The more unstructured a movement is, the 
less control it has over the directions in which it develops and the political 
actions in which it engages” (p. 162). A telling example of losing control over a 
movement’s direction was the entering of powerful neoliberal NGOs into the 
International Council, without creating any relevant debate covered by the 
chaotic arrangements and the high need for money. Another example related to 
the local organisation of the WSF 2007 was the choice of entering a big contract 
with Celtel for the sponsoring of the Forum, which was taken by only a couple of 
people and without any public debate. 
Another important point of Freeman’s argument that is highly relevant to the 
WSF process is what she calls the “star” system. Similarly to the 1970s women’s 
movement, the WSF charter states that no one represents it, nor can speak in its 
name. However, media and members need someone to make public statements 
about the group position. Without an official spokesperson, media would 
generally look for the movement’s “stars” to get authoritative statements about 
the group, choosing the most famous activists or scholars who may not 
necessarily be those that other members feel to be more representative. A 
similar argument was put forward by Gitlin (2003) who looks at how, in the 
absence of officials representatives, media could shape movements of the US 
New Left by choosing the activists to transform into celebrities unaccountable to 
their base. In the previous section of this paper, I have shown how not-so-
representative ‘social movement entrepreneurs’ end up talking on behalf of 
large categories of people. Freeman thinks that this process is very destructive, 
because the movement has no control in the selection of its representatives to 
the public, and the “stars” find themselves attacked by their comrades. She 
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concludes that, “This achieves nothing for the movement and is painfully 
destructive to the individuals involved” (p. 159).  
The refusal of methodologies perceived to be linked to liberal democracies led to 
the full adoption of consensual methodologies, and the elimination of 
‘traditional’ democratic practices, such as voting. However, this choice – 
especially with the excessive idealisation of the method – led to undemocratic 
practices whereby the entire discussion was dominated by a well-consolidated 
group in the IC, self-nominated at the beginning of the process in 2001 and 
irremovable since there was no formal channel to renovate the leadership. As 
we have shown, the supposedly open space of the IC was highly influenced by 
the economic and social resources of the participants, and by the unquestioned 
membership of the founding group, exercising a feudal-type authority by 
working through implicit but consolidated alliances, intelligible to newcomers, 
and therefore more difficult to challenge, as suggested by Freeman (1972). The 
original core membership was enlarged to include new actors admitted at the 
discretion of existing IC members, creating in this way a sort of patronage 
relationship. The process contributed to create what Pleyers calls “an 
international alter-globalisation elite” (2010, p. 145).  
Even Whitaker, a founder and important intellectual of the forum and strong 
supporter of consensus in decision-making, acknowledged that “certain types of 
consensus […] are a beautiful façade of systems of domination allegedly 
democratic” and that “openness and horizontality do not mean absence of rules” 
(2012, p. 3). As Teivainen (2012, p. 191) put it, “As long as there are no clear 
procedures for resolving disputes within the governance bodies of the WSF, the 
workings of power will continue to take place mostly through mechanisms that 
have not been collectively agreed on”. He argues that the strongly held idea that 
an open space cannot become an institution or organisation depoliticises the 
WSF. He and others acknowledge the role of the “depoliticised 
structurelessness” (p. 191) as an attractive novelty at the beginning of the 
process. However, Teivainen claims that as the WSF became an important 
global platform for democratic transformations, it should take the political 
seriously by “recognising relations of power in order to democratise them” 
(2012, p. 191). 
The economic aspect was also important; the IC was quite open to accept new 
members, but new members had to fund their participation, and possibly 
financially contribute to the WSF process. ‘Southern’ organisations had to fly 
their members across the globe at least four times a year – a commitment of 
well over 10,000 euros, just to be present at the meetings.10 One outcome of this 
IC arrangement was that while the social movements landscape changed very 
rapidly, the governance structure of their privileged meeting space – the WSF – 
                                                        
10 These tickets are particularly expensive; while a connection from Europe or Northern America 
to any developing country is generally direct and relatively inexpensive as the major hubs are 
located in these continents, South-to-South flights, for instance from Latin America to Asia, 
pass through Europe and are very expensive. 
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did not, remaining every year more distant from the social reality of the 
movements. 
In Nairobi, the use of a ‘neutral’ technology (i.e. the online software) to promote 
new partnerships and encounters – without passing through a formally 
structured system – largely failed, and the participatory consensual 
methodologies led to the tyranny of the few ‘facilitators with the knowledge’. 
Expert knowledge in facilitation became a key asset, whose owners abused it by 
using their facilitation role to impose their views, as shown in the thematic 
meeting on debt. To the “tyranny of structurelessness”, the “tyranny of the 
method” was added (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). On this point, Cooke and Kothari 
showed the tendency of participatory approaches to conceal alternative views 
that might have emerged using other methods (2001). 
The WSF is an open space that keeps people together united by their being 
against neoliberalism, and, in order to maintain its openness and diversity, it 
has refused to take seriously into account the issue of power. At the same time, 
this open space decided to build concrete alternatives and to move into action, 
but without rethinking its governance structures. In such a process, decisions 
need to be taken, and someone will take them even without adequate decision-
making structures. At the Kenya Forum, the result was the domination of those 
who had been able to exploit their advantaged position and had the social 
capital and the resources to fight for their proposal without any mediating 
structure, rules or constraints that would limit their exercise of power. However, 
I would argue that even if the WSF 2007 had not aimed at preparing a global 
action plan and had remained just an open space, the issue of power would have 
needed some serious rethinking anyway. An open space that gathers all global 
movements together is a political actor that needs governance, and therefore 
structures and methodologies have to be thought out seriously, even if it had 
decided to avoid speaking on behalf of its members. This governance issue has 
been explored by other authors, particularly Teivainen (2004, 2012), and the 
reform of the IC has been a hotly debated argument in the subsequent years, 
giving the rise to a working group on the IC future in 2012, including Whitaker’s 
proposal (2013) for its dissolution and reconstitution as a global movement. 
The WSF 2007 organisational mess has contributed to the process of 
privatisation of the open space. In Nairobi, it was a double privatisation. On one 
side, the WSF contracted the organisation of the Forum to one NGO without the 
structures to render this organisation accountable or ensure that it would put in 
place an inclusive and open process. On the other, not having an operational 
working structure, the NGO that won the WSF tender subcontracted – often to 
private firms and multinationals – the provision of the services needed to make 
the Forum possible. 
Another process facilitated by the lack of transparent and clear governance 
procedures and structures and connected with the “privatisation” of the Forum 
was the funding from big foundations belonging to the corporate elites, or from 
NGOs largely funded by the US government that reinforced the influence of 
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those more institutionalised organisations within the process, thus co-opting 
the forum (Chossudovsky, 2010). 
The other point is the one of access; the open space had serious barriers of 
access against those people whose interests it claimed to defend. The system 
favours those people who are affiliated with bigger organisations, often 
development NGOs. The poor, unorganised citizens, and the more grassroots 
organisations could barely make it to the Forum without submitting their 
independence to larger networks, and often to depoliticised foreign (or at least 
foreign-funded) development NGOs, reproducing quasi-colonial power relations 
instead of the horizontal space that the Forum claims to be.  
Another critical reflection concerns the discursive construction of the WSF 
against something,11 namely neoliberalism, domination of the world by capital, 
and any form of imperialism (WSF, 2001). This has defined the WSF in 
opposition and in antithesis to neoliberalism, creating a rigid dichotomy. If the 
WSF celebrates diversity, its ‘enemy’ – neoliberal globalisation – is conceived as 
a homogeneous domain, and the WSF exercises the monopoly of diversity 
against the ‘One Truth’ (Whitaker, 2004). This view fails to consider that WSF 
practices are hybrids, and that the fight is not between two monolithic blocs, i.e. 
neoliberal as homogenous and anti-neoliberal as diverse and open. This 
conception is paradoxically reinforcing an old political practice of framing the 
political struggle within dichotomies. Neoliberalism, including existing 
institutions and political practices of current society is presented as a 
homogeneous domain with no spaces for engaging with it. This construction is 
used by WSF activists from the so-called “traditional left” (Santos, 2007) who 
conceive the struggle as a choice between neoliberal capital and socialism, 
weakening the wide range of diverse options that the WSF represents. For 
example, Eric Toussant12 quotes Chávez and agrees with him on socialism as the 
only alternative to neoliberalism. Some radical grassroots’ groups argue that 
this dichotomous construction enabled “forces of the traditional left, including 
leftist political parties, trade unions, and large non-governmental organisations, 
to establish an hegemony over a new kind of movement that had largely escaped 
their control” (Juris, 2005, p. 2008). 
This Manichean view is also connected with a very limited understanding of 
power, and prevents any transformative engagement with neoliberal 
institutions, excluding the possibility of conducting the struggle within these 
existing institutions of the society (e.g. international financial institutions, 
governments, etc.) as advocated by Gramsci. These places should be the field of 
struggle, and as many scholars, especially anthropologists (e.g. Lewis & Mosse, 
2006), have shown, there is space for agency. The WSF rhetoric and the 
dichotomy it constructs with its monopoly of diversity and resistance prevents 
                                                        
11 Glasius and Timms underline the “logical contradiction in the idea of an open space against 
something” (2005, p. 224). 
12 Member of the WSF IC and founder of the CADTM (Committee for the Abolition of Third 
World Debt). 
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people from viewing the entire world as a battlefield of daily resistance 
practices. This rhetoric also prevents WSF activists from critically analysing 
their own behaviours and discover how neoliberal and undemocratic practices 
are embedded in their daily lives and activities of their movements. 
This dichotomous view of the world reinforces a misleading representation of 
the reality that enforces the interests of the powerful both within the neoliberal 
and the anti-neoliberal arrays. It transforms the struggle into ‘us’ (anti-
neoliberal) against ‘them’ (neoliberal), without challenging the power structure 
and the practices within ‘us’ at the advantage of ‘social movement 
entrepreneurs’ and other dominant leaders. As shown above, the practices of 
WSF activists, especially in their relationships with other people or in decision-
making processes, often reproduce the same mechanisms of domination on 
which neoliberalism is founded. Similarly, feminists’ analyses have observed an 
ungendered and deracialised discourse in the antiglobalisation movement, 
underpinned by an “implicit masculinisation” (Mohanty, 2003) which 
paradoxically reflects the dominant discourse of neoliberal globalisation. 
According to Conway (2011), the radicalism of the WSF exempts its (male) 
leaders from “examining their own gendered, raced and classed positionalities, 
from acknowledging their own privilege, and recognising how their everyday 
practices in the movement and in the forum can reproduce dynamics of 
oppression or marginalisation” (p. 57). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to unpack the idealised view of the WSF and some of 
its myths surrounding a process that is inevitably and inherently messy. Many 
of the activists and academics who criticise ‘the neoliberal project’ have been 
looking at the WSF as the solution (e.g. Klein, 2001; Wallerstein, 2007), or as 
the “counter-hegemonic globalisation” (Santos, 2007, p. 4) opposed to the all-
encompassing neoliberal discourse. The WSF discourse has quickly become 
idealised by the romanticised reporting of western academics, who manifested 
an oriental, exotic attitude towards the WSF in which they looked for evidence 
for their global revolutionary theories (e.g. Arrighi, Santos), rather than 
providing critical input to the movement. In this paper, I have sought to 
challenge the dominant narratives of the WSF by looking at the “asymmetry 
between the values and the practices of the WSF process” (Caruso, 2004, p. 
577), at the gap between the discourses of democratic and open process, and the 
reality of hegemonic practices, and I have problematised some methodological 
and organisational choices. The focus of the analysis is the practices of the WSF 
2007, widely recognised to have been one of the most problematic forums. As 
acknowledged in the article, the WSF processes has reflected upon many of 
these critical issues, leading to some organisational changes. However, it is still 
relevant to bring an in-depth reflection of the empirical experience and use it to 
make a wider argument.  
The attempt of large inclusion and the focus on diversity conceptualised in the 
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framework of the open space have led to a lack of clear structure, which resulted 
in the “tyranny of structurelessness”. Moreover, the dichotomous construction 
of the struggle against neoliberalism can lead to a disengagement with the 
institutions of the society that, in my view, should become the field of struggle, 
and it has also paradoxically reinforced the position of the ‘traditional left’ 
rather than promoting a diverse range of alternatives.13  
While the inclusive diversity discourse attracted a wide range of actors, the WSF 
diversity pillar presented some side effects that were not properly dealt with. To 
maintain diversity, the WSF defined itself against something – neoliberalism – 
so that everyone could agree and be part of it, and became quickly labelled as 
anti-globalisation (although many activists challenged this label identifying 
themselves with the term alter-globalisation). The identity of the WSF became 
based on strengthening the dichotomy between the WSF movements and 
neoliberal institutions. The movement identity was defined as an inverted 
mirror of neoliberalism. The enemy was defined as the supreme evil, 
eliminating spaces for dialogue and – to a certain extent – internal criticism. 
The WSF discourse, arrogating to itself the “monopoly of diversity” against the 
“one truth” of neoliberalism, also led to a failure to recognise the evolution and 
the complexity of the current mainstream neoliberal discourse, especially in its 
new institutional “post-Washington Consensus” form. Literature that looks at 
the interaction between grassroots movements and the state (e.g. Corbridge, 
Williams, Srivastava, & Véron, 2005) have revealed the hybridity and multi-
faceted presence of the state in the life of citizens, and how movements have 
adopted mainstream development discourses productively to frame their 
struggles and make their claims to the state (Sinha, 2003). These forms of 
resistance produced political subjects, engaging the state and demanding rights 
in the language of the neoliberal state, challenging rigid approaches that over-
emphasise the domination/resistance dichotomy. 
My criticism of the WSF process – and particularly of its internal hegemonic 
practices– has been often viewed as destructive pessimism concerning the 
possibility of social change. I am positive about the possibility of social change, 
but the situation is far more complex than the neoliberal/anti-neoliberal 
dichotomy. On the contrary, I strongly believe in engaging and struggling 
against the neoliberal discourse in any available domain where there is space for 
agency, multiplying the battlefields, and starting with the fight against 
hegemonic practices within our daily lives. 
The current attitude has helped to maintain despotic power relations and 
hegemonic practices within a process that claims “to be more participatory and 
democratic” (Glasius & Timms, 2005, p. 190) and thus “practising politics in a 
different way” (2005, p. 191). I do not believe that the WSF is only acting in the 
interests of “a handful of people who decided to privatise a very public and, of 
course, very global process” (Oloo, 2007), however, in the WSF process, there 
                                                        
13 See for instance Juris (2005). 
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are complex constellations of conflicting interests which need to be further 
analysed, made explicit, fully acknowledged and openly discussed.  
An important point to make is around what happens or should happen in the 
“open space” of the WSF. Even from supporters of the WSF as an arena, there is 
recognition that the encounters between movements should be more than 
merely presenting each other respective agendas. The WSF can be described as 
a transformative encounter in which participants may change their preferences. 
Della Porta (2013) emphasises the difference between a view of a democratic 
process which simply aims at counting which view is majoritarian and one 
which contributes to constructing such views. For the latter, drawing upon 
Habermas’ work, Della Porta reminds the importance of how opinions are 
formed: “As preferences and/or identities are always in flux, the conditions 
under which they are formed are of vital importance for democracy” (p. 187). 
This explains my focus on the how which, in my view, entails taking decision-
making rules and structures seriously.  
Della Porta (2015) argues that, by experimenting with forms of deliberative and 
participatory democracy, these movements have demonstrated the importance 
of democracy for collective deliberation. This paper warns about the limitations 
and challenges of such methods, particularly the “tyranny of the 
structurelessness” combined with the “tyranny of the method”, with the hope 
that reflexive attitudes amongst activists may lead to further thinking about the 
relationship between power and global movements’ organisational structures 
and decision-making practices. This analysis based on 2007 materials is 
particularly relevant today in the light of the global Occupy as well as anti-
austerity movements in Europe, which make similar claims to those of the WSF 
of being leaderless initiatives, without any political affiliation, and using 
consensual methodologies, thus facing some of the same shortcomings and 
challenges.  
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